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A contract by an attorney-at-law to render services

to

prevent the finding of an indictment against one
accused or suspected of crime is illegal and void,
without respect to the belief of the attorney as to
the accused, and compensation stipulated to be
of
the guilt
paid for such services cannot be recovered: Weber v. Shay,
(Supreme Court of Ohio,) 46 N. E. Rep. 377.
Attorney-at
Law,
Contract for
Services

In Fourtth Street Natl. Bk. v. Yardley, (Supreme Court of
the United States,) 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439, the president of the
asked
Keystone National Bank of Philadelphia
Banks and
The Fourth Street National Bank, in the same
Banking,
Equitablet city, to give his bank $25,ooo in clearing-house
Assignment,
Chequesand certificates, stating that it owed a large balance at
Drafts
the clearing house, which it could not meet,
because its funds were in New York. He also exhibited a
memorandum showing that his bank had a reserve fund of
about $27,0oo in a certain New York bank, and proposed to
give a draft thereon for the amount of the certificates. In
reliance upon these representations and the memorandum, the
certificates were delivered and the draft taken. The New
York bank refused to accept the draft, and paid over the funds
and turned over the collection items in its hands to the receiver
of the Keystone Bank. The Fourth Street bank then brought
suit against the receiver. The bill was dismissed, and that
decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 55 Fed.
Rep. 8 50; but this latter decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court, on the ground that though the mere giving of a bank
cheque or draft in the ordinary course of business does not
operate as an equitable assignment of the fund, it is competent
for the parties to create such an assignment by a clear agree322
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ment or understanding, oral or otherwise, in addition to the
cheque or draft, that the transaction shall have that effect; that
the facts in this case showed an equitable assignment of the
fund, which would enable the drawee to claim it against the
receiver of the drawer, which failed on the following day; and
that the assignment operated not only upon cash actually
owing by the New York bank at the time, but also upon
money or drafts of the drawer in course of transmission or
collection by it.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently decided, that
under Rev. Stat. Wis., § 4541, which provides that "any
officer, director, stockholder . . . manager . .
Receiving
Depositswhen or agent of any bank, who shall accept or receive
Insolvent
on deposit or for safe-keeping or to loan, from
any person, any money, or any bill, notes, or other paper,
circulating as money, or any notes, drafts, bills of exchange,
bank checks or other commercial paper for safe-keeping or
for collection, when he knows or has good reason to know,
that such bank . . . is unsafe or insolvent, shall be punished
by imprisonment," etc., the receipt of money giving a certificate
of deposit therefor, payable at a certain time, with interest, is
receiving it on "deposit;" that it is immaterial that part of
the sum thus received was a certificate of deposit given by the
bank, and then due, with accrued interest thereon, which was
then surrendered; and that to show the insolvency of a bank
at the time an officer is charged with receiving a deposit,
knowing of its insolvency, evidence of the amount of deposits
with it at the time, and the amount of paper held by the bank,
and the worthlessness of that paper, is admissible: State v.
Shove, 70 N. W. Rep. 312.
The inventory of the assignee of an insolvent banker, made
within thirty days of the date of the assignment, (that being
Receiving
Deposits
When
Insolvent,

Evidence

made one week after the receipt of the deposit,) is
admissible in evidence on the trial of the assignor,
a banker who had been indicted for receiving
money on deposit when knowing himself to be

insolvent. It is not conclusive, but it is a necessary step iii
the proceedings, tending to show the assets in the hands of
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the assignee for the payment of debts: Commonwealth v.
Smith, (Superior Court of Pennsylvania,) 4 Pa. Super. Ct. I.
The by-laws of a building association, which provide that
loans on real estate may be repaid at any time on thirty
for
days' notice," and that on default in interest
Building
assessor
taxes,
insurance,
in
or
months,
three
Associations,
mOrtgages, ments on the day they fall due, the principal shall
Foreclosure

become due, apply only to out and out loans, and
not to mortgages given to secure advances made by the association in redemption of stock, which are not to be repaid by
the mortgagor: Commercial Building & Loan Assn. of Richmond, Va., v. Mackenzie, (Court of Appeals of Maryland,)
36 Atl. Rep. 754.
The argument of the court is hardly convincing. The word
"assessments" stands in the way of its conclusiveness.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has lately held, that
a person entitled by the terms of his railroad ticket to "personal passage" in a railroad car, has not the right
Carriers,
Contract of to carry with him packages of groceries for the
Carriage,
use of his family; that the officers of the railroad
Personal
Passage,

company, after he enters the car, cannot lawfully
take such packages from him by force; that the
remedy of the company, after giving him notice to remove
such packages from the car, and his refusal to do so, is to
remove both the passenger and his packages, using no unnecessary force; and that if the officers forcibly take the packages
from the passenger, and put them in the express or baggage
cars, he can recover the value of his packages, and for the
injury done to himself or his clothing, but nothing more:
Delaware,L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Bullock, 36 Atl. Rep. 773.
When there are two customary routes from the point of
shipment to the destination, one through a cold country and
the other through a warm, and the latter route
Negligence
becomes obstructed, the carrier is negligent in
sending over the cold route, without notice to the shipper or
Packages
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,consignee, goods which it is bound to know are destructible
-by frost: Pierce v. Southern Pac. Co., (Supreme Court of California,) 47 Pac. Rep. 874.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, a trust created by conveyance of land to several
.Charitable persons, as trustees of an unincorporated associaTrust,
tion for the mutual aid of its members, with
Burying
Ground,
Cy Pres,
Resulting
Trust,

Perpetuty

hzabendun to them "and their successors in office,
forever, for the sole use and benefit of' the association,' for a burial ground, and for no other purpose
whatever," even if a charitable trust, is not for

-such a general purpose as could be executed cypres, and it
will end, at the latest, when the land ceases to be used as a
burial ground, and the association is dissolved; that upon the
termination of this trust, a resulting trust arises to the grantor
.and his heirs, and the trustees, or their heirs, hold the legal
title to the land, charged with that resulting trust; and that
:the estate so resulting to the grantor and his heirs, since it
does not arise under the grant, but .by reason of the failure
.thereof, is not within the rule against perpetuities: Hopkins v.
,Grifnshaw, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4O.
The Circuit Court for the District of Indiana has lately held,
Conflict of in accordance with the weight of authority, that
Laws,
the contract of a married woman, valid by the
Contracts of
Married
Women

law of the place where it is made, is valid and
binding upon her, although by the law of her

-domicile she is prohibited from making such a contract:
Bowles v. Field, 78 Fed. Rep. 742.
A guarantee of her husband's debt by a married woman,
which she could not make by the laws of Massachusetts, but
-could by those of Maine, contained in a note signed in Massachusetts, and mailed to the payee in Maine, has been held to
be a Maine contract, and valid: Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass.
:374, 1878; Bellv. Packard,69 Me. 105, 1879. So, a married
-woman's bond, signed in Pennsylvania, prior to the married
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woman's act of 1887, and delivered in Delaware, accompanying a purchase money mortgage of real estate situated in
Delaware, purchased by the married woman, was enforced
against her in Pennsylvania, being a valid obligation in Delaware: Baum v. Birchall, 150 Pa. 164, 1892.

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently declared, that when a criminal convicted by a state court escapes.
and becomes a fugitive, pending his appeal to
Constitutional
Law,
the state supreme court, it is competent for
Due Process
that court to order*the dismissal of the appeal
unless he shall surrender himself or be recaptured within sixty
days; and the dismissal of the appeal at the end of the sixty
days is not a denial of due process of law: Allen v. State of'
Georgia, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 525.

According to the same court, it is within the power of a
state, in the absence of federal legislation on the subject, to
forbid under penalty the heating of passenger cars
Interstate
Commerce

within that state by stoves or furnaces kept inside

the cars, or suspended therefrom, though such cars may be
employed in interstate commerce; and this power cannot be
affected by possible inconveniences resulting from the adoption
of conflicting regulations by adjoining states: N. Y., N. H. &
H. R. R. Co. v. People, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 418.
In the same case it was also held that Rev. Stat. U. S.
§ 5258, authorizing all steam railroad companies in the United
States to carry freight, passengers, etc., from one state into
another, and to connect with other roads so as to form continuous lines of transportation, does not interfere in any wise
with the enactment of laws by the states to promote the safety
of passengers, while traveling within their respective limits
from one state to another, in cars propelled by steam, and that
a statute forbidding the heating of passenger cars by stoves, on
railroads of over fifty miles in length, is not such a discrimination against roads of greater length, as to amount to a denial
of the equal protection of the laws, required by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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A code adopted by a single act of the legislature, though
it may contain inconsistent provisions, and one section may be
Amendatory modified by another, is not within the letter or
Statutes,
spirit of the constitutional provision that no law
Codes
shall be revised, amended or extended by reference to its title: Ex parte Thomas, (Supreme Court of Alabama,) 21 So. Rep. 369.
The Circuit Court for the Northern District of California
has lately held, that the provision of the constitution of California, (Art. 12, § 22,) that the rates of charge fixed
Rates fixed
by Railroad by the railroad commission shall be deemed conCommission clusively just and reasonable in all controversies,
civil and criminal, is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore void: Southern Pac. Co. v. Board of Railroad Corers. of California,78 Fed. Rep. 236.
In the same case the court laid down a number of rules for
fixing rates of charge, the most important of which are (i)
That while a state has power to regulate railroad
Rules for
Fixing Rates rates, that power, as well as the right of a railroad
company to control its business, stops at injustice, the state
having no right to fix a rate unreasonably low, though it may
prevent the railroad from fixing one unreasonably high; (2)
That rates for railroad transportation are not necessarily
unreasonable, when they amount to practical confiscation,
nor reasonable if they allow any dividend, however small; but
a railroad company is entitled to be reimbursed its charges
and expenses, and to receive, besides, an adequate return
upon its investment; and (3) That in ascertaining the cost of
operating a railroad, with reference to determining the reasonableness of rates, the expenses of operation are not to be
strictly limited to the cost of running trains, excluding all
betterments; but the cost of reasonable renewals and improvements of road-bed, track and equipment should be included
in the operating expenses.
According to a late decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, a contract by which a manufacturer appoints a firm
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as a "special selling factor," to handle his goods,
and under which all goods consigned are to remain,
the property of the consignor until sold at prices fixed by the
consignor, the consignees to protect the consignor from any
decline in price, and to have the benefit of any advance, and
which also requires the consignees to remit for all goods consigned at the end of sixty days, whether sold or not, or whether
collected for or not, and does not require any report made
as to sales, is a contract of sale, and not of agency, in so far as
it tends to affect the rights of third persons; and the consignor
can neither impress a trust upon the property of the consignees
for the proceeds of sales of such goods collected and used in
their general business, nor claim the ownership of outstanding
accounts against customers of such goods, as against other
creditors: Arbuckle v. Kirkpatrick, 39 S. W. Rep. 3.
A contract by which, in consideration of the purchase of
stock in a corporation, the buyer is to be editor and manager
Enforcement, and have control for a definite time of a newsPersonal
paper published by the corporation, at a fixed
Services
salary, subject to his appointment and salary
Contract,
Construction

ceasing, and according to which the seller has a right to buy
back the stock, if the buyer engages in other business, or the
revenues of the paper fail to amount to a certain sum, is not a
mere personal contract for services, which cannot be enforced
in equity by enjoining any interference with his management
and control; and though the buyer cannot be compelled to
write editorials or exercise management over the newspaper,.
there is no such want of mutuality of remedy as will prevent
the granting of an injunction to enjoin such interference:
Jones v. Williams, (Supreme Court of Missouri,) 39 S. W. Rep486.
In the opinion of the Circuit Court for the Northern District
of
Illinois,
system
of indexes,
letter
file, isa not
a proper
subject constituting
of copyright:a
Amberg File & Index Co. v. Shea, 78 Fed. Rep. 479.
The Supreme Court of California has recently held, that a
constitutional provision (Const. Cal., Art. 12, § IO,) which
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Corporations, prohibits the passage of any law permitting theLease,
leasing or alienation of any franchise so as to
Liability
relieve the franchise or property held thereunder
from liabilities contracted in the operation of that franchise,
does not give the employe of the lessee of a corporation a
right of action against the corporation for injuries received
through the wrongful act of the lessee in the use of the leased
property; but that though an act of the legislature authorizes
one railroad company to lease its franchises and property to.
another, the lessor company is liable to an employe of the
lessee for injuries caused by the improper construction of the
road: Lee v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 47 Pac. Rep. 932.
If a person acts as director of a corporation, and fails to file
an annual report, as required by law, he cannot escape personal liability to the creditors of the corporation
Directors,
on the ground that he did not hold the number
Liability,
Failure to File of shares of stock requisite to qualify him for the
Report
position of director: Donnelly v. Pancoast, (Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department,) 44 N. Y. Suppl. 104.
Minority stockholders, who cannot, through the directors
or stockholders, obtain relief for the voting of excessive salaries
to officers, are entitled to relief in equity, but in
Minority
Stockholders, order to support a bill by them on that ground
Relief
they must aver facts to show why the bill is,
necessary; and the mere fact that these stockholders elected
the seven directors does not warrant the presumption that
those directors would refuse to discharge their duties to the:
corporation and the minority stockholders when requested,
nor does the fact that an appeal to the stockholders would be
unavailing excuse a failure to apply to the board of directors
before filing the bill: Decatur Mneral & Land Co. v. Palm,
(Supreme Court of Alabama,) 21 So. Rep. 315.
Receivers' certificates, issued by the receiver of a purely
private corporation, are not a charge upon the assets of the
corporation in preference to existing liens, as
Receivers'
Certificates, against lienors who have not consented to their
Liens
issue: Doe v. Northivestern Coal & Transp. Co.,
(Circuit Court, D. Oregon,) 78 Fed. Rep. 62.
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According to a recent decision of the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, it is necessary, in order to sustain a plea of
CriminalLaw, antrefois convict, that the offenses charged in the
two indictments should be identical, and that the
Former
Jeopardy,
Antrefois
Convict

evidence necessary to a conviction on the latter
should be sufficient to convict of the offense charged

-in the former; and that the identity of the offenses should
appear on the record, and not on the inferences to be deduced
therefrom. Therefore, if the record shows that the evidence
necessary to support a conviction on the second indictment
would have been insufficient to procure a legal conviction on
the first, the plea of antrefois convict is not sustained. Applying these principles, the court held that the conviction of a
banker for receiving the money of one depositor while insolvent, was no bar to his prosecution for receiving the money
of another, under the same conditions: Commonwealth v.
Rockafellow, 3 Pa. Super. Ct. 588.
An express provision in the descriptive part alone of a
.recorded deed, that the building line shall be a specified
distance from the street, is a perpetual restriction
Deed,
on the use of the land, binding on purchasers
Building
Restriction from the grantee whose deeds contain no reference
.thereto: Appeal of Townsend, (Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut,) 36 Atl. Rep. 815.
The new woman must again take a back seat. Those
.naughty men will not let her vote. This time it is the
Supreme Court of Indiana, which holds, with
Elections,
befitting gravity, that under the constitution of
Female
Suffrage,
Constitutional that state, Art. 2, § 2, which provides that, "in
all elections not otherwise provided for by this
Law
constitution, every male citizen of the United States of the age
-of twenty-one years and upward, . . . shall be entitled to

vote," sex is a qualification of the right to vote for public
officers; and that that section is not in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment, which provides that the right of the
-citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
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abridged, nor in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides that all persons born and naturalized in the
United States are citizens of the United States, and that no
state shall abridge their privilege, since it does not confer the
elective franchise upon women: Gougarv. Timberlake, 46 N.
E. Rep. 339. One would like to see the argument against
this view. It would be most entertaining reading.
In answer to a request from the governor for advice, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island has declared that the constitution of that state, Art. 8, § 2, which provides
voting
Machines
that voting shall be by ballot, and that, "in all
cases where an election is made .by ballot or paper vote, the
manner of balloting shall be the same as is now required in
voting for general officers, until otherwise prescribed by law,"
an act is constitutional which authorizes the use of a votingmachine, by which the choice of the voter is indicated by a.
puncture in a roll of paper on which the names of the candidates are printed: In re loting Machines, 36 Atl. Rep. 716,.
Rogers, J., dissented.
The Supreme Court of Montana has placed itself on record
as one of the few courts that have taken a rational view of the
Australian ballot system. The Political Code
Elections,
Ballots,
of Montana, § 1361, provides that if a voter
Marking
desires to vote a straight party ticket, he may
do so by making a cross at the head of the list representing
his political party, and if he desires to vote for any candidates
on any other list he shall make a cross opposite the name of'
every candidate for whom he desires to vote; and § 1403
provides that any ballot or part of a ballot from which it is
impossible to determine the elector's choice shall be void,.
but that if part of a ballot is sufficiently plain to gather
the elector's intention therefrom, that part shall be counted.
Under these provisions, the Supreme Court of that state
holds that a ballot marked with a cross at the head ofthe list representing a political party, and a cross opposite the
name of a candidate in another list for an office for which there
is no candidate in the first list, will be counted for that candidate and all candidates in the first list, since, though the
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provision for the use of a cross to indicate choice is mandatory,
that for putting a cross opposite the name of every candidate
when a voter desires to vote for candidates in more than one
list is merely directory; but that if a cross is put at the head
of one party's list of candidates, and opposite the name of a
.candidate in another list for an office for which there is a
candidate in the first list, the ballot will not be counted for
either candidate for that office, but will be counted for all
other candidates in the first list: Dickerman v. Gelsthorpe,
47 Pac. Rep. 999.
The second point was likewise ruled in State v. Franshaw,
-(Supreme Court of Montana,) 48 Pac. Rep. I, where it was
also held that when electors vote the official ballots supplied
to them by the judges of election, their legally
Irregular
Ballots
expressed will cannot be overthrown, if they are
not at fault, by the fact that the officer who prepared the
ballots in some way neglected his duty.
According to a recent decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit, an electric light company, which maintains wires
Electric Light
Company,
Negligence

carrying an electric current of high power on poles
used, in common with it,'by other companies, for
the support of their wires, owes to an employe of

one of such other companies, who is lawfully upon the pole,
in pursuance of the common right, the duty of exercising
ordinary care to keep its wires so safely insulated as to
prevent injury to that employe, though, in the performance of
his work, he may enter upon a separate cross-arm of the
-electric light company or accidentally touch its wires: Newark
Electric Light & Power Co. v. Garden, 78 Fed. Rep. 74.
Acheson, Circuit J., dissented.
The Supreme Court of Texas has adopted the rule, held
almost everywhere, that a conveyance of an expectant interest
Equitable
in an estate may be valid in equity; and that the
Assignment, assent of the ancestor is not essential to the
Expectant
Interest

validity of a conveyance by an heir of his expectant interest, particularly when he is non compos mentis: Hale
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v. Hollon, 39 S. W. Rep. 287, affirming 35 S. W. Rep. 843..
If the transaction is fair, equity will uphold the conveyance
of an expectant estate, and, if necessary, will enforce it, whether
the ancestor assents or not. This rule prevails everywhere but
in Kentucky: Beckley v. Newland, 2 P. Wins. 182, 1723;
Harwood v. Tooke, 2 Sim. 192, 18O9; Cook v. Field, 15 Q.B.
46o, I85O; In re Garcelon's Estate, 104 Cal. 570, 1894;
Clendening v. Wyatt, 54 Kans. 523, 1895; Curtis v. Cur/is,
4o Me. 24, 1855; Quarles v. Quarles, 4 Mass. 68o, i8o8;
Kenney v. Tucker, 8 Mass. 143, 1811 ; Trull v. Eastman, 3
Metc. (Mass.) 121, 1841 ; Bacon v. Bonham, 33 N. J. Eq. 614,
x881, affirming 27 N.J. Eq. 209, 1876; Stover v. Eycleshe'mer, 3 Keyes, (N. Y.) 620, 1867; Kinyon v. Kinyon, 27
N. Y. Suppl. 627, 1894; McDonaldv.McDonald, 5 Jones Eq.
(N. C.) 211, 1859; Bodenhamerv. Welc, 89 N. C. 78, 1883;
Power's Appeal, 63 Pa. 443, 1869; Fitz'sEstate, 16o Pa. 156,
1894; In re Kuhn's Estate, 163 Pa. 438, 1894; Fitzgeraldv.
Vestal, 4 Sneed, (Tenn.) 258, 1856; Steele v. Frierson,85 Tenn.
430, 1887; Gore v. Howard, 94 Tenn. 577, 1895; contra,
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 474, 1859; Alves v.
Scldesinger, 81 Ky. 290, 1883; McCall v. Hampton, (Ky.)
32 S. W. Rep. 406, 1895.

The result of an autopsy on the body of one for whose
death an action is brought is not privileged under a statute
which
(Code Civ. Proc. Cal. § I88I, sub-d. 4,)
Evidence,
provides that "a licensed physician or surgeon
Privileged
Comunications cannot, without the consent of his patient, be
examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in
attending the patient which was necessary to enable him to
prescribe or act for the patient." "A dead man is not a 'patient,'
capable of sustaining the relation of confidence towards his
physician which is the foundation of the rule given in the
statute, but is a mere piece of senseless clay, which has passed
beyond the reach of human prescription, medical or otherwise:"
Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry. Co., (Supreme Court of California,)
47 Pac. Rep. IOl9.
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A contract made by an offer to an executor, and an acceptExecutor,
Binding
Estate by
Contract

ance thereof by him, in his own name, for the

erection of a monument for the estate of which he

is executor, does not create a liability which can
be enforced against the estate: Durkin v. Langley, (Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts,) 46 N. E. Rep. 1i1.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut, one who is convicted and sentenced for
Extradition, a crime, and whose term of sentence has not yet
expired, is "charged" with the crime, within the
Interstate,
Prisoner on
Parole

meaning of Art. 4, § 2, of the Constitution of the
United States, which requires that a person charged in any
state with a crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in
another state, shall be delivered up to the authorities of the
state from which he fled; and a prisoner who is allowed to go
outside of a New York Reformatory on parole, as allowed by
statute of that state, on his promise to obey the directions con-tained in that parole, one of which is that he go to Michigan,.
but comes to Connecticut instead, is a fugitive from justice,
within the same provision: Drinkall v. Spiegel, 36 At.
Rep. 830.

Though the insured in a policy of accident insurance may
have been guilty of acts which would charge him with
contributory negligence, these acts do not constiAccident
tute a defense to an action on the policy, unless
Insurance,
Negligence of
Insured

they are expressly made a defense by its terms;
for the liability of the insurer upon the policy depends upon contract, and the terms of that contract must govern: Traveler's
Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Randolpht, (Circuit Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit,) 78 Fed. Rep. 754.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of Mississippi,
Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias v. Stein, 21 So. Rep. 559,
Benefit

Insurance,
Suicide,

BY-Law,

Knights of
Pythias

it appeared that the charter of the Knights of
Pythias provides that the supreme lodge alone

may pass a regulation against suicide; that the
plaintiff's intestate obtained a benefit certificate
before any such regulation was passed; that he
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"subsequently applied for an increase, and signed an application
which contained a provision against suicide, inserted by the
"board of control, which was a mere subordinate administrative
body, and a provision that the insured was bound by all laws
passed by the board of control, and thereupon surrendered
the old certificate; and he committed suicide sometime thereafter. The court held, that the regulation againsi suicide
made by the board of control could not be considered as a
by-law, because it was not in the power of the board to make
by-laws; and that it could not be regarded as an essential part
of the contract, though expressly assented to by the deceased,
since the charter, providing that the supreme lodge alone had
power to make regulations against suicide, was part of the
-contract, and nullified the suicide clause in the application.
A fire insurance policy on household goods which provides
that it shall be void if the hazard is increased by any means
within the knowledge of the insured, or if fireworks
Fire
Insurance, are allowed on the premises, is rendered void by
Breach of
Conditions,
Fireworks

the fact that the insured permits fireworks to be
placed in the house on one day (in this case July

3,) to be used the next: Heron v. Plzenix Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
(Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,) 36 Atl. Rep. 740.
According to a recent decision of the last-named court,
Life Insurance, Tritsclderv. Keystone Mutual Benefit Assn., 36
Suicide,
At. Rep. 734, a provision in a life insurance
Insanity
policy that the insurer shall not be liable if the
:insured commits suicide, even when insane, is valid.

When on the back of a paper containing instructions taken
into the jury room and returned with the verdict, there appears
a memorandum showing twelve different amounts
Jury,
in a column, the total thereof, and its division by
Quotient
Verdict
12, the verdict, which corresponds with the quotient so obtained, will be set aside, on the presumption that it
is the result of an agreement by the jurors, in advance, to
average their separate assessments: Southern Ry. Co. v.
.Wiliams, (Supreme Court of Alabama,) 21 So. Rep. 328.
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In Jones v. German, [1897] I Q. B. 374, the Court of
Appeal has affirmed the decision of the Chief Justice, [1896]
Justle of the 2 Q. B. 418. (See 36 Ar. L. REG. N. S. 138.)
In that case, a justice of the peace had issued
Pence,
Search-Warrant,
Legality

a search-warrant, upon a sworn information

stating that the informant had "just and reasonable cause to
suspect and doth suspect that W. J. has in his possession
certain property belonging to [the informant,] and that he has
requested the said W. J. to allow him to search several boxes,
which the said W. J. has had packed, ready to be taken away,
and which he refuses to be looked through." The warrant
was executed, and W. J. brought an action of trespass against
the justice, alleging that the information was insufficient, and
that the warrant was consequently illegal and without jurisdiction. The Chief Justice gave judgment for the defendant, and
this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, on the
ground that a search-warrant may be issued on an allegation.
of reasonable suspicion of larceny; that it is not necessary to
allege in the information that a larceny has in fact been
committed, but that it is enough to allege a suspicion that a
larceny has been committed; that it is not necessary to specify
in the information the particular goods for which a search is
desired; that the information in question substantially averred
that the informant suspected certain property of his to have
been stolen; and that it was sufficient to give the justice
jurisdiction.

The arrogance of the labor unions has met with another
rebuff The Court of Appeals of New York
Labor Unions,
Contract

Compelling

Employe to Join,

Legality

has recently ruled that a contract between a
brewers' association and a labor union, providing that no employe of the former should be

allowed to work for more than four weeks without becoming
a member of the latter, is an attempt to interfere with the right
to pursue a lawful trade or calling, and hence is void as against
public policy: Curran v. Galen, 46 N. E. Rep. 279.
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A promise to repair, made by a landlord to his tenant
during the tenancy, and with no other consideraTenant,
tion than the tenancy, cannot be enforced : Taylor

'Landlord and
Promise to
Repair

v. Lehrman, (Appellate Court of Indiana,) 46 N. E.

Rep. 84A landlord who lets an unfurnished house in a dangerous
Dangerous
condition, he being under no liability to keep it in
Premises
repair, is not liable to his tenant, or to a person
Liability o
Landlord
using the premises, for personal injuries happening
-during the term, and due to the defective condition of the
house: Lane v. Cox, (Court of Appeal of England,) [1897]
i Q. B. 415.

According to the Supreme Court of Louisiana,
omous publication, made in the form of a printed
Libel,
which purports to be a reply to another
Anonymous
cation, the authorship of which is not
'

Pamphlet,
Recrimination

an anonypamphlet,
communifurnished,

cannot be said to be libelous per se, as allegation
and proof are required to connect that pamphlet with the
complainant; and when one's methods of teaching have been
unduly criticised by a rival who pretends to superiority, color
is given to the excuse of making a reply, and the recrimination,
if kept within reasonable bounds, is not libelous, or at any
rate, the parties are in pari delicto, and the aggressor cannot
complain: Mielly v. Soule, 21 So. Rep. 593.
The complaint in this case alleged that the following parts of
the pamphlet referred to were libelous: First, the quotation
heading said pamphlet, "Oh what a tangled web we weave,
when first we practice to deceive; " Second, the comparison
of the petitioner's circular to one termed elsewhere in the
pamphlet a "charlatan" teacher; Third, the application of the
adjective "smattering," to the course of book-keeping taught
by the petitioner; Fourth, the allegation that the petitioner's
course was "copied and worked" from a treatise on bookkeeping by one R. A. Wright, "the noted eighteen-hour
charlatan teacher;" Fifth, the use of the adjectives "delusive"
and "decoying" with reference to the petitioner's circular;
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and Sixth, a quotation from Dante's Inferno, as to the punishment of impostors in the tenth gulf of Hades. The opening
sentence of the pamphlet was as follows: "A very pretentious
teacher of book-keeping in this city, whom we will designate
as the 'No Nonsense' teacher, has woven a tangled -web, long
and wide, by publishing many erroneous and deceptive statements of his superficial course."
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has held the
following newspaper article libelous, as tending to subject the
plaintiff to contempt and ridicule:
Contempt
" Giles, a Manchester man, has relieved his
mind to Bryan by 0. K.-ing New Hampshire. Now let the
procession move."-Nashua Press.
"Avast there, you lubberly liar! Giles a Manchester man!
not by eighteen full lehgth miles. He's a Concord man, froni
the sole of his cloven hoof to the crown of his cranky head.
Then why do you pin him upon the map of Manchester?
What have we done that you put such an indignity as that
upon us? Haven't we trouble and annoyances enough withour share?
and Cand Pout him? Aren't BIsn't the Bowery about all our reputation will bear? Giles a
Manchester man! Impossible. Nothing has escaped from
Barnum's aggregation of humbugs and featherheads. General
W-'s
collection of exhibition apes hasn't arrived, and
didn't comb anything out of his head while he was here.
FThere is no imaginable source from which Giles could have
come to Manchester. We have had the freshet, the insect pest,
, F-,
and a great variety of other
the drouth, O
unwelcome visitations this summer, but thus far we have
escaped Giles:" Giles v. John B. Clarke Co., 36 At. Rep.
876.
In Bennett v. Salisbury, (Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit,) 78 Fed. Rep. 769, a newspaper proprietor, residing
in Europe, established for the guidance of his
Newspaper
Publication, employes a rule that communications of a personal
Falsity,
nature sent by unknown correspondents must be
Malice
verified on investigation by an accredited correspondent, and,
when so verified, might be published. In an action based upon
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a scandalous story, thus received, verified, and published, but
which was utterly false, the court held that it was properly
left to the jury to determine whether the rule evinced such
wanton disregard of another's right, and such reckless indifference to consequences, as to be equivalent to malice,>,which
would authorize the recovery of primitive damages.
A false charge of criminal misconduct against an officer is
Candidate not privileged because he is a candidate for election
for Office
to a public office: Forke v. Homan, (Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas,) 39 S. W. Rep. 210.
The Supreme Court of the United States has just rendered
one of the most important decisions of recent years; and it is
Monopolies,
Trust

to be regretted that the court was not more nearly
unanimous. In United States v. Trans-M7.souri

Combinations,

Railroad
Traffic
Associations,

'Interstate
Cominirce

Fr1g t Assn., I7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540, it held,
reversing 58 Fed. Rep. 58, against the dissent of
Justices White, Field, Gray and Shiras, that the act
of July 2, 1890, (26 Stat. at Large, c. 647; Suppl.

Rev. Stat. U. S. p. 762,) which provides that "every contract,
combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal," includes
all contracts or combinations operating in restraint, of trade or
commerce, whether they be such as were held legal or illegal
at common law, and whether the restraint imposed is reasonable
or unreasonable; that it therefore applies to a contract between
competing common carriers by rail, forming an association for
the purpose of maintaining and regulating rates of transportation, as such agreements were not authorized or sanctioned by
the interstate commerce act of February 4, 1887, and there is
consequently no inconsistency between the two acts; and that
an agreement between a number of competing railroads engaged
in interstate traffic "for the purpose of mutual protection by
establishing and maintaining reasonable rates, rules, and regulations on all freight traffic, both through and local," and
forming an association to prescribe rates which, when agreed
to, are to govern all the companies, and a violation of which
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subjects the defaulting company to a pecuniary penalty, is an
agreement or combination in restraint of trade or commerce,
in the meaning of the anti-trust law, though each party to theagreement may withdraw therefrom on giving thirty days'
notice.
If a purchaser of the equity'of redemption on mortgaged
premises agrees to pay the mortgage as a part consideration
Mortgage,

for the purchase price, upon the representation of

Right of
Purchaser of
Equity of
Redemption,
Subrogation

the grantor that there are no judgments or liens,
outstanding against the grantor or the property,
and pays the mortgage accordingly, but subsequently discovers that there is a judgment against.

the grantor, recovered subsequent to the date of the mortgage,
which is still a valid lien upon the property, he will be entitled
to subrogation to the rights of the mortgagee against the
mortgagor, if the rights of the judgment creditor are not affected
thereby: Johnson v. Tootle, (Supreme Court of Utah,) 47 Pac.
Rep. 1033.
In In re Gribben, 47 Pac. Rep. 1074, the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma recently declared void, on the ground that it was
unreasonable, was not essential or indispensable
Municipal
Corporations, to the carrying into effect of any of the purposes
Ordinances,
Reasonableness,
Parades

for which a city is created, and was oppressive
and in contravention of common rights, the following ordinance intended to interfere with the operations of
the Salvation Army: "The making of any noise upon the
streets or sidewalks of the city, by means of drums or musical
instruments or otherwise, of such a character, extent and duration as to annoy and disturb others, is hereby prohibited; and
it is hereby made the duty of the mayor and the city marshal
to order any person or persons, making such noise, to desist
therefrom, and the failure of or refusal of such person or
persons to promptly obey such order of the mayor or city
marshal is hereby declared to be a misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof such person or persons shall be punished by
a fine of not less than five dollars and not more than one hun-
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dred dollars for each offense, in the discretion of the court, and
shall be imprisoned in the county jail until such fine and cost
of the prosecution are paid.
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, the
councils of a municipal corporation, whose charter provides
Regulation o that the councils may make ordinances to regulate
the public streets to prevent immoderate driving or
street
Railways riding, to provide the manner in which corporations or persons shall exercise any privilege granted to them
in the use of the streets, to regulate the running of locomotive engines and railroad cars therein, and to protect persons
and property, has power to enact an ordinance that all passenger cars operated by trolley or electric power in the streets
of the city shall have proper and suitable fenders on the front
of such cars to prevent accident, and that it shall be unlawful
to operate such cars in the streets of the city without such
fenders: State v. City of Cape May, 36 Ati. Rep. 696.
The Supreme Court of the United States has .lately held,
that a stockholder of an insolvent national bank may bring a
suit in a state court, in behalf of the bank and
National
Banks,
himself, as a representative stockholder, against
Right of
-Stockholder the directors, to recover money alleged to have
been lost through their negligence and breach of trust, when the
bank's officers, the receiver, and the comptroller ofthe currency,
have all refused to bring such a suit: Exparte Chetwood, 17
Sup. Ct. Rep. 385 ; and that one who appears upon the
official list of the names and residences of the share holders of
insolvency, a national bank only as "pledgee " of a specified
Shareholders,

Pledgee of
Stock

number of shares of the capital stock of that bank,

nothing else appearing, is not a shareholder within
Rev. Stat. U. S. § 5151, and is not subject to the liability
imposed by that section upon shareholders of national banks Pauy v. State Loan & Trust CO., i7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465,
affirming 58 Fed. Rep. 666.
The last mentioned court has also decided, reversing 78 Fed.
Rep. i75, that the provisions of Rev. Stat. U. S. § 5283,

.342
Neutralty

Laws,
Vlstigo,

Assisting
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which forbids the fitting out and arming of a vessel
with intent that she shall be employed in the
service of any foreign prince or state, "or of any

colony, district, or people," include any insurgent
-or insurrectionary body of people acting together and conducting hostilities, though their belligerency has not been
recognized: The Three Friends, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495.
Insurgeuts

The Supreme Court of New York, at Special Term, for Erie
County, has recently held that the Daily Mercantile Review,
Newspaper,
What
Constitutes

published in sheet form in the city of Buffalo,
having a circulation of 1,500 copies in the county
and 3,6oo elsewhere, and containing several

columns daily of news matter of general interest, and advertisements of all kinds, is a "newspaper" in which notices of
foreclosure sales may be published, within the meaning of the
Code of Civil Procedure, § 1678, though it is chiefly devoted
to market reports, financial and mercantile items, local court
proceedings, and lists of instruments recorded, and is sold only
by subscriptiori: Williams v. Colwell, 43 N. Y. Suppl. 720.
Parties who make and advertise for sale in their catalogue,
.as an independent device, one part of a patented combination,
which part is valuable only in connection with the
Patents,
Contributory other elements of the combination, are guilty of
Infringement contributory infringement: Thomson-Houston Elec.tri Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., (Circuit Court, N. D. Ohio, E. D.,)
y8 Fed. Rep. 139.
In Geilfuss v. CorriZgan, (Supreme Court of Wisconsin,) 70
N. W. Rep. 3o6, S., the owner of a majority of the stock of
a mining company and of a furnace company,
Pledge,
caused the furnace company to issue, without
Storage
but with no. fraudulent intent,
consideration,
Warrants,
.Non-Delivery
storage warrants in the usual form of warehouse
receipts on the iron in its yards in favor of the mining company; but there was no actual delivery of nor agreement to
purchase the iron. These warrants were delivered by S., as
president of the mining company, to a bank, which took them
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in good faith, as collateral security for a loan. Some time
after the issue of these warrants, a creditor of the furnace
company levied upon and sold the iron under a judgment for
advances to the furnace company. The assignee of the bank
then sued the creditor to recover the value of the iron. The
court below found for the plaintiff, but this judgment was
reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that the bank
acquired no rights superior to the creditor, because (i) the
storage warrants were not warehouse receipts, not being issued
by a warehouseman storing goods for compensation; (2) they
were not valid as chattel mortgages, not being such in form,
nor filed, as is required in cases of such mortgages; and (3)
they were not sufficient as contracts of pledge, because there
was no delivery of the iron.
Whisky sold as a beverage or commercial commodity, by
one who is neither a druggist nor pharmacist, has been held
to be within the provisions of the Ohio Pure Food
Pure Food
Law which provides:
Law,
§ i, That no person shall, within this state,
Whisky
manufacture for sale, or offer for sale, or sell any drug or
article of food which is adulterated within the meaning of this.
act.
§ 2. The term drug as used in this act, shall include all
medicines for internal or external use, antiseptics, disinfectants.
and cosmetics.
And if it is not of the prescribed degree of purity, the
vendor will be liable to the penalties of the act: State vHutcinson, (Supreme Court of Ohio,) 46 N. E. Rep. 71.
In Central Trust Co. v. Carter, (Circuit Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit,) 78 Fed. Rep. 225, the holders of the bonds of
an insolvent railway company entered into a
Railroad
trust agreement with certain persons constiCompanies,
Reorganization
Agreement,
Authority of
Reorganization
Committee

tuting a reorganization committee, and a trust

company, by which the reorganization com-

mittee was authorized, in very broad terms, to
procure the sale of the railway; to adjust, by arbitration or
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.otherwise, the rights of a construction company which had
contracted to build the road; to negotiate and compound with
holders of claims against the railway, and provide for payment
thereof; and to borrow money, and pledge as security the
bonds deposited under the agreement. This committee entered
into an agreement with certain parties holding claims against
the railway company and the construction company, some of
-whom had obtained judgments declaring contractors' liens in
their favor against the railway company, by which agreement
these claims were assigned to the committee, and certain
securities of the railway company, held by the construction
.company, were released in consideration of the promise of the
committee to deliver to such claimants negotiable certificates
for certain sums, payable in cash, and secured by the bonds
deposited with the committee. The claimants performed their
part under this agreement, but the committee never delivered
the certificates. Subsequently the railway was sold under
foreclosure, and upon an intervening petition by the claimants
who had assigned their claims to the committee, the court
decreed that they were entitled to be paid the amount of the
promised certificates out of the proceeds of sale applicable to
the payment of the bondholders. The trustee for the bondholders appealed from this decision. But the Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the agreement with the claimants, who had
at least apparent right against the railway, was within the
authority of the reorganization committee, and that in spite of
the fact that the certificates were never delivered, the agreement should be treated as a mortgage on the bonds, and the
claimants were therefore entitled to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale.
In Missouri K. & T. Ry. Co. v. ilIler, 39 S. W. Rep. 583,
the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas recently held, in accordance
with the weight of authority, (i) That when a
Negligence,
Person

Assisting
Another on

person is permitted, without objection, to enter a

car in a railway train, at a station, to assist a
passenger to a seat, and. before entering, states to
the conductor that he intends to get off, it is the duty of the
conductor to so regulate the movement of the train as to give
Train

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

him a reasonable time to leave the car without injury; (2)
That if such information is given to a porter or brakeman, and
the conductor in starting the train acts upon the statement of
the porter or brakeman that it is "all right," the railroad
company is chargeable with the notice given that the person
desired to leave the train, as if it had been given to the
conductor directly; and (3) That the absence of any rule
forbidding it and of any objection on the part of those in
.charge, operates as a consent on the part of a railroad
company that a person not a passenger may enter one of its
cars for the purpose of assisting a passenger to a seat.
Land conveyed to a corporation in fee does not revert to
the grantor or his heirs, on the extinction of the corporation;
and it makes no difference in this regard that the
Reversion,
Extinct
existence of the corporations is limited by law to
Corporation thirty years: Wilson v. Leary, (Supreme Court
of
North Carolina,) 26 S. E. Rep. 630, overruling Fox v. Horah,
i Ired. Eq. (N. C.) 358, 1841.
In Cuny v. Lasell Seminary Co., (Supreme Judicial Court
,of Massachusetts,) 46 N. E. Rep. i io, the plaintiff sent her
Schools,

Reasonable
Regulations,

Rights of

Parents

daughter to the defendant's school, agreeing to be

bound by the conditions of the catalogue, which

provided that scholars should not be absent from
school except at regular recesses. On one occa-

sion the plaintiff's request that her daughter be allowed to
spend Sunday with her, which had been granted on several
previous occasions, was denied. She took her daughter with
her in spite of this refusal; and when she brought her back
the school authorities refused to allow her to remain any
longer in the school, unless the plaintiff would accept their
interpretation of the contract, which was that the officers of
the school had absolute discretion to determine when pupils
should be permitted to be absent. The plaintiff refused to
accept this construction, took her daughter away, and sued to
recover the money she had advanced for board and tuition.
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The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant; and this:
was affirmed, the court holding that the regulation as to
absence, as construed by the defendant, was reasonable, and
that the defendant was not obliged to permit the plaintiff's.
daughter to remain in the school, unless she would consent to
be bound by it.
Specific performance will not be decreed of a contract to
convey "a house and lot," when the house has only three
walls, the beams and girders being inserted on
Specific
Performance the fourth side into a wall on the lot of an adjoining owner, though the vendor has a prescriptive right to the
use of the wall for that purpose: Spero v. Schultz, (Supreme
Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department,)
43 N. Y. Suppl. ioi6.
An act which authorizes a vehicle license by cities, provided
it shall only apply to vehicles used in the transportation of
goods and merchandise, and for hire at public
Taxation,
Bicycles
stands, and by livery stables, does not authorize a
tax on a bicycle used only by its owner for pleasure : Davis
v. Petrinovitch,(Supreme Court of Alabama,) 21 So. Rep. 344.
A writing purporting to be the joint will of two persons
cannot be probated as such in the life of one of them; but a
Joint Wills, writing jointly executed by two persons, purportProbate
ing to be their will, devising to a third person
lands, parts of which belong to each, can be proved as the
separate will of one, on his death, while the other is still living:
In re Davis's Will, (Supreme Court of North Carolina,) 26
S. E. Rep. 636, overruling Clayton v. Liverman, 2 Dev. & Bat..
L. (N. C.) 558, 1837.
In a recent case before Reeves, J., of the Chancery Division,
a testatrix had bequeathed to her husband a life interest in
gave him "power toods
disGift for Life, certain real estate, and behm"oe
Power
of
pose
of
all
such
property
by
will
amongst
our
Appointment,
Neglect to
children." The will contained no gift over in
Exercise
default of appointment. There were children, but
Power
the husband died intestate without having
exer-
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•cised the power of disposition. Upon these facts, the judge
held that when there is a gift to one for life, with a power to
him to appoint among a class, but no gift to the class and no
gift over in default of appointment, the court is not bound,
without more, to imply a gift to the class in default of the
-exercise of the power; that in this case the power conferred
on the husband was a mere power and not one coupled with
a trust; and that consequently there was no gift to the children by implication, and that the heir at law of the testatrix
was entitled: n re Weekes's Settlement, [1897] I Ch. 289.
Ardemus Stewart.

